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In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, 
such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural 
language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts 
of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean 
intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assump-
tions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, 
that Stephen Schiffer’s so-called meaning-intention problem is not pow-
erful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in con-
temporary philosophy of language and mind.
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1. Introduction
Many linguists and philosophers of language believe there are linguis-
tic expressions which are phonetically unrealized. Such expressions 
are syntactically real but lacking in phonetic and phonological proper-
ties. One of the most theoretically entrenched examples is (big) PRO 







 wants PRO1 to win]]
and is anaphoric on its head NP. Clearly, the postulation of a silent 
expression like PRO raises all sorts of fascinating questions, some of 
which have been of particular interest to philosophers.
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Stephen Neale, in ‘Silent Reference’ (2016), does an excellent job of 
bringing the questions and issues involved to the fore.1 He is particu-
larly concerned, as I see it, with showing that philosophers ought to 
be more careful and discerning in their use of this instrument in theo-
rizing. Surely, his advice should be taken to heart. Philosophers need 
to consider when it is appropriate and plausible to posit phonetically 
unrealized expressions or syntax and when it is not. It may, for exam-
ple, be all too tempting for, say, an epistemologist to say that speakers 
simply refer implicitly to epistemic standards whenever they use the 
word ‘know.’ But this raises all sorts of questions. How do they do so? 
Are they aware of doing it? And are they aware of doing it in the way 
the theory says they are?
However, in this paper, I argue that Neale’s basic metaphysics is 
too restrictive to do justice to the theoretical options open to philoso-
phers. He assumes, specifi cally, that it would be absurd to entertain 
the possibility of uttering phonetically null expressions. He also defi nes 
the class of aphonics of interest as expressions which, ‘by their very na-
ture,’ lack phonological properties. I argue that these are mistakes and, 
further, that they are inconsistent with Neale’s other commitments. 
And those other commitments are, by the look of it, more important. 
In the fi nal section, I argue that Stephen Schiffer’s so-called meaning-
intention problem and Neale’s related aphonic-intention problem are 
considerably less serious than they suggest. Borrowing a page or two 
from Peter Carruthers’ (2011) work and from research in dual system 
psychology, I show that Schiffer and Neale make doubtful and contro-
versial assumptions about the reliability or transparency of speakers’ 
self-knowledge, making the meaning-intention problem far less effec-
tive in combating the alleged over-intellectualization of other theorists. 
Importantly, however, I argue that Gricean intention-based semantics 
can easily survive as a Cartesian divorcee, since meaning can still be 
determined by speakers’ communicative intentions; they just don’t nec-
essarily have conscious awareness of the contents of those intentions.
2. Mad Hatters, Cheshire Catters, and Troublemakers
According to Neale, there is implicit reference and indirect reference. 
An object is referred to indirectly when a proposition which is merely 
implicated by a speaker has an object dependent truth condition. Im-
plicit reference, however, occurs when a speaker expresses an object 
dependent proposition without there being any particular linguistic ex-
pression with which reference to the object is achieved. So, for example, 
if some philosophers are to be believed, and speakers can intend to 
refer to the location of the rain by merely uttering
(2) It’s raining
1 Page numbers in parentheses refer to Neale’s paper unless indicated otherwise.
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on a given occasion, then implicit reference is indeed ubiquitous in lin-
guistic communication. In very general terms, there are two schools of 
thought on the nature of implicit reference: The Mad Hatters and The 
Cheshire Catters. The Hatters (for short) believe speakers can refer 
without there being anything at all with which they refer. They are 
as mad as a hatter, speak in riddles, expect their audience simply to 
work out what they intend and, just like the Mad Hatter, are punished 
before committing a crime rather than after (it’s all in the pragmatics, 
you see). The Catters don’t speak in riddles but they see non-existent 
objects everywhere, such as smiles and aphonic variables. In particu-
lar, they pretend to see these objects even when there is no theoretical 
need to do so.
Now, more precisely, the Catters are philosophers who wish to posit 
aphonic syntactic material in order to explain any plausible case of 
implicit reference. So, for example, just like linguists want to introduce 
the aphonic PRO in (1), Catters might propose to introduce an aphonic 









as a possible syntactic representation of (2).2 On this model the aphonic 
variable could be occurring as an NP within a larger PP (substitutable 
for ‘in Dublin’) or as an AdvP (substitutable for ‘here’). In this case, 
introduction of the variable is motivated, most obviously, by the claim 
that a location is necessary for an utterance of (2) to be evaluable for 
truth or falsity and, also, by the idea that the variable could be bound 
by an explicit quantifi er, as in ‘Everywhere I go, it’s raining.’ Mad Hat-
ters like Neale and Schiffer, however, consider it much more important 
that ordinary speakers actually see themselves as having intentions to 
refer to a location when uttering a sentence like (2). More about that 
particular madness later (§4).
It seems like Neale wants in some sense to be both a Hatter and a 
Catter, so he takes on the role of Alice in ‘Silent Reference,’ trying to 
make sense of all the strange things in Wonderland. He tries to make 
the debate between Hatters and Catters more precise and starts by 
pointing out certain limitations of being a Catter. He points out that 
aphonic expressions like x in (3) and (unwritten) in (2), will have some 
rather strange features. First, they are proper parts of the sentences 
in which they occur but they never correspond to any part of any utter-
ance of the sentence. This makes them very different from expressions 
like ‘cake’ and ‘eejit.’ Secondly, he argues, on this basis, that there can 
2 Note, however, that almost everything about (3) is controversial because, for 
one, expletive ‘it’ is here either a non-argument or quasi-argument. If it is construed 
as a non-argument—as in constructions like ‘It seems that ...’—the gerundive 
‘raining’ in (2) ought to be analyzed as CP with empty complementizer. It’s also 
worth noting that many theorists would propose much more complicated analyses of 
a sentence like (2), involving multiple hidden variables—for time of utterance, the 
utterer, the world, etc.—I focus on the location variable here for simplifi cation (see, 
e.g., Lewis 1970).
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be no such thing as compositional semantics in which the meanings of 
parts of utterances compose to yield meanings for whole utterances, if 
one of the parts is supposed to be an utterance of an aphonic expres-
sion. A whole utterance of a sentence is a sequenced event which can be 
segmented into sub-events where each sub-event corresponds roughly 
to a word in the sentence. And, again, if ‘eejit’ is part of the sentence 
uttered, there will normally a be a roughly demarcated part of the 
utterance-event which corresponds to that word. No such utterance-
parts will be found to correspond to PRO or x in (1) and (3). Therefore, 
compositional semantics cannot take as inputs the meanings of parts 
of utterances, if the semantic properties of aphonics are to play any role 
in composition. Composition must take as inputs the semantic proper-
ties of something other than utterances of expressions, it would seem; 
perhaps the expression-types themselves.
It would seem to follow, then, that one can’t like utterance-based 
compositional semantics while being a Catter. But, of course, there are 
those who appear to do exactly that and we can call them Mad Catters 
(Stanley 2007 and Recanati 2010 are possible examples). After looking 
around for truthmakers to make Neale’s two claims true, I realized I 
could fi nd nothing but troublemakers. In what follows I discuss two 
such troublemakers before, in the next section, turning to more specifi c 
arguments against Neale’s position. We should all be free to be Mad 
Catters when I’m done.
2.1. Omissions
Neale is rightly concerned with spelling out the nature of and connec-
tions between words, sentences, utterances, propositions and so on. 
Words are abstract artifacts created by linguistic communicative acts 
and sentences are then, presumably, abstract structures suitable to 
contain such artifacts in various syntactic arrangements. On Neale’s 
view, utterances of sentences are events. Specifi cally, they are events 
whereby sentences are represented or, as he likes to put it, utterances 
are proxies for sentences. He makes the important point that the tra-
ditional distinction between expression-types and expression-tokens 
blurs and confounds these more fi ne-grained distinctions. There are 
not two fundamentally distinct kinds of linguistic expressions, i.e. 
types and tokens; there are, rather, expressions and various kinds of 
proxies for those expressions. A somewhat similar point has been made 
before (Searle 1978; Kaplan 1990) but the distinction still looms large 
in the literature and Neale makes particularly clear how detrimental 
to good theoretical sense it can be. Crudely put, utterances or inscrip-
tions of sentences are not sentences any more than a picture of the 
Queen is the Queen.
Neale’s discussion of aphonics would have been helped, though, by a 
more detailed examination of the kind of event an utterance or inscrip-
tion is. As he is most certainly aware, utterances (let’s ignore inscrip-
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tions for now) are events under intentional description as their source 
is an intentional agent with goals, reasons, desires, beliefs and various 
cognitive and circumstantial limitations. In brief, they are intentional 
actions. Relatedly, the interpretation of an utterance by a normal hear-
er is geared towards the event as an intentional action: why did they 
choose those words? why are they saying what it seems like they’re 
saying? Interpretation is geared towards reason-based explanations of 
intentional action. Linguistic interpretation—interpretation of speech 
acts—is just a special case of attempts at action understanding more 
generally. We automatically and effortlessly interpret human actions 
in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions (e.g. Carston 2002: 42–44). 
Seeing someone walking repeatedly over some area in a fi eld, their eyes 
moving quickly from one part of the grass below to another, I imme-
diately assume they want to fi nd something they lost, and that they 
believe it is there somewhere.
Already, this is a prima facie troublemaker for Neale’s argument 
against Mad Catters. For ease of exposition, let’s use ‘action’ for a com-
plex intentional action and ‘act’ for any proper part of such a complex. 
What I mean by ‘proper’ part here is that the part is intentional just 
as much as the more comprehensive action of which it is a mere part. 
So, when I intentionally bake a cake, the act of breaking the eggs is an 
intentional proper part of the more comprehensive action. According to 
some philosophers, there are actions and acts that have no spatiotem-
poral properties at all. These are so-called acts of omission or refrain-
ing. Randolph Clarke (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014) argues, for example, 
that some omissions consist in the total absence of action relative to an 
agent, time, and location. Omissions can be unintentional or intention-
al; the latter he calls refraining. One further condition on refraining 
to V, for Clarke, is that there is some norm, standard, or ideal in place 
to the effect that one should V (2014: 29). There are others, however, 
who argue that refraining is always a type of action (e.g. Brand 1971; 
Fischer and Ravizza 1998). So, if an MP chooses to refrain from voting 
on a bill in parliament some particular bodily movement—or, even, the 
act of keeping still exactly then and there—must constitute the act of 
refraining at that time and place.
In fact, it doesn’t matter what ontology of omitting or refraining we 
commit to, Neale’s argument can only be saved if he can show that Mad 
Catters are, for some reason, not allowed to appeal to these notions in 
welding together aphonics and utterance-based compositional seman-
tics. All parties to the debate agree that there is a sense in which people 
can intentionally omit to do something. Kent Bach (2010: 54–56) insists 
that, still, there is no sense in which refraining or omitting can count 
as actions or acts. But, as he realizes, omitting is not simply not doing. 
What counts as an omission, Bach agrees with Clarke, “is itself partly 
a normative matter” (Bach 2010: 54). So, whatever else it is, refraining 
from acting is part of folk psychology on all fours with acting, speaking, 
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expressing, and so on. That is to say, even if refraining to act is not re-
ally to act at all or consists in the absence of particular acts or actions, 
these non-acts can fi gure signifi cantly in speech acts, their planning, 
and in the interpretation of speech acts. For our purposes, then, there 
is no harm in calling omission and refraining acts or actions. Just bear 
in mind that they could turn out to consist in the absence of an action or 
act on a given occasion—and so, strictly speaking, they are not actions 
or acts—or, alternatively, they correspond to something that was actu-
ally done. All we would need to do to accommodate Bach’s insistence is 
to say that understanding intentional behavior in general is directed 
towards two kinds of objects; action and inaction.
To be clear, I am arguing that refraining to act on an occasion is in 
perfectly good standing, on anyone’s account, when it comes to the au-
tomatic attribution of mental states to intentional agents in explaining 
their behavior. When I see someone accidentally drop a penny while 
walking in high-grown grass, stopping only for a fraction of a second 
to gaze down, I immediately assume they believe they lost a penny 
and that it is pointless to look for it. Arguably, Pennyless (their name) 
refrained from searching and I, watching, automatically explained this 
fact to myself by assuming various things about their mental state. If 
asked, Pennyless might confi rm that searching for the coin would have 
been pointless, hence better to decide to do nothing at all. If I were Pen-
nyless I would have done the same, I might think, and doing the same 
is the doing of nothing.
If refraining fi gures in action explanation generally, it also fi gures 
in utterance explanation in particular. As Clarke (2014: 32) points out, 
one of Strunk and White’s famous dicta in The Elements of Style was 
“omit needless words.” Clarke adds that, whenever one complies with 
this stylistic norm, one brings about the omission of words by the act of 
omitting their use. Furthermore, syntactic structure itself provides for a 
wealth of low-grade normative properties to capture the sense in which 
speakers refrain from uttering one thing in uttering another. So, for 
example, when I utter (2) while in Dublin it’s clear to all that I should 
have added ‘here’ or ‘in Dublin’ if I wished to be more explicit, and if in-
deed my plan was to talk about the weather where I was located. There 
is a longer construction which I should have used in case I believed the 
context called for it. Let’s say, then, that I refrain from saying explicitly 
where it rains in uttering (2). My refraining either consists in the ab-
sence of an act or it consists in some short-lived or instantaneous move-
ment or other; quick breath, glance, gesture, whatever.
We have, then, candidate acts for being parts of utterances corre-
sponding to aphonic parts of sentences. Utterances are actions which 
can, on occasion, be partly constituted by acts of refraining from saying 
something explicitly. Moreover, speakers can easily report on their acts 
of refraining after the fact. MPs may abstain from voting and report 
this by raising a hand or saying “I abstain”. On some views, these lat-
 E. Unnsteinsson, Saying without Knowing What or How 357
ter actions would actually be spatiotemporally constitutive of the act 
of abstention but, as I have said, my argument doesn’t require this as-
sumption. I conclude that it makes perfectly good sense to say that, on 
occasion, speakers will intentionally perform the act of omitting to say 
explicitly. They do so, for instance, when they utter (2). This suffi ces to 
make trouble for Neale’s argument. We have found a candidate to be 
the utterance-part corresponding to any plausible aphonic sentence-
part. The candidate plays a signifi cant role in speakers’ capacities for 
mindreading, communicating, interpreting and explaining intention-
al action more generally. We could even imagine the communicative 
defects one would incur if one were, so to speak, omission-blind, and 
could only ever understand action, never inaction. Surely, this would 
be debilitating. And, fi nally, if there is an aphonic location-variable in 
sentence (2) it can correspond to the act of refraining from referring 
explicitly to a place.
2.2. Gaps
And what’s the problem with instantaneous or durationless proper 
parts of utterances anyway? As research in phonetics and phonology 
shows, the correspondence relation between the abstract sentence or 
word and their audible utterance proxies is extremely complex and 
counterintuitive. This work has, for example, revealed what is some-
times called the ‘lack of invariance problem,’ namely that there is no 
one-to-one correspondence between acoustic signals and perceptual 
categorization into phonetic segments. In speech perception, different 
acoustic patterns are invariably perceived by hearers as a single pat-
tern. Speech perception is ‘categorical’ on this way of thinking. The 
main reason for this is the phenomenon of coarticulation: the fact that 
discrete segments of speech are infl uenced acoustically by the imme-
diately preceding or following sounds uttered. Take the articulation of 
the /p/ segments in ‘pole’ and ‘peel.’ The different positions of the lips, 
which is explained by the difference in the following vowels, creates dif-
ferences in the acoustics. Normally, however, this difference is not re-
fl ected in the hearer’s perception of the utterance (Unnsteinsson 2017).
Another counterintuitive feature, more relevant to our concerns, is 
that coarticulation occurs both within words and across words in fl ow-
ing speech, resulting in the fact that, most of the time, gaps between 
words are not indicated by the continuous speech signal at all. Obvi-
ously, this is where inscription is usually very different. So, to take 
Neale’s example, in uttering (4) the speaker sequentially produces fi ve 
word-occurrences although the sentence contains only four words.
(4) The cat ate the mouse
Now, let’s just assume the phoneticians and phonologists are right about 
all of this. This creates well-known problems about how knowledge of 
word boundaries is acquired so quickly and effortlessly by children. Yet 
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such knowledge can elude adults for a long time as well, for particu-
lar expressions (looking online for two seconds I found the example of 
‘housechablis’ instead of ‘house Chablis’). But this seems to be another 
troublemaker for Neale. When competent speakers utter (4) they will 
utter a sentence containing at least four word-gaps indicating that one 
word has stopped and another has begun. But the gaps in the sentence 
will almost never correspond to any identifi able gaps in any utterance 
of the sentence. The question is: how do speaker/hearers then learn 
where one word ends and another one begins? Presumably the answer 
has something to do with learning to identify similar acoustic patterns 
in different linguistic contexts. For example, competent speakers will 
also understand an utterance of, say, ‘The mouse ate the cat.’ But, of 
course, it will still be the case that almost no particular utterance of (4) 
contains parts corresponding to the word-gaps. So, competent speakers 
can utter a sentence with four gaps, understand effortlessly that the 
sentence has four gaps, without there being recognizable gaps in the 
utterance itself.
But the trouble doesn’t start properly brewing until we reach the 
level of the phrase marker. If linguists are to be believed, sentence pro-
cessing in ordinary speaker/hearers must involve the mental construc-
tion of an abstract syntactic structure. A fully developed human pars-
er—the internal mechanism for processing sentences—at least assigns 
structures encoding various dependency relations between words and 
phrases to sentences encountered in speech and writing. In a recent 
book, David Pereplyotchik provides a wealth of arguments for the psy-
chological reality of what he calls ‘mental phrase markers.’ The most 
telling arguments are based on results from brain-studies in neurolin-
guistics, so-called structural priming experiments, and on plausible ex-
planations of garden-path effects. The data strongly suggest that there 
is an independent syntactic processing-stage which occurs before any 
semantic or pragmatic information is accessed. And this stage involves 
the construction of mental phrase markers identical to those developed 
by generative grammarians (Pereplyotchik 2017, Ch. 5).
Take structural priming, for instance (see Pickering and Ferreira 
2008 for review). If a speaker encounters and parses a sentence with 
postulated phrase marker P then, the theory predicts, P has been acti-
vated in the speaker’s mind. If P is activated it should remain so for a 
while and should show up in other mental processes. Experiments con-
fi rm that there are strong priming effects of this sort. So, if P is primed 
in sentence perception it becomes much more likely that a P-sentence 
is produced later, even if semantically equivalent sentences with other 
phrase markers are equally or more salient in the context. The human 
parser, it seems, automatically assigns phrase constituency structure 
to sentences.
It’s important to note that, in spite of this, many theorists would ar-
gue either (i) that speakers have no knowledge or beliefs about mental 
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phrase markers; even that they aren’t mentally represented, or (ii) that 
any such knowledge or belief is tacit, subpersonal, subdoxastic, or inac-
cessible to consciousness.3 Cognition involving mental phrase mark-
ers, on most accounts, does not reach personal-level explanation. This 
contrasts with speakers’ beliefs about what they intend to say or refer 
to on a given occasion of utterance. For normal humans, it seems trivi-
ally true that they know what they mean by uttering something. They 
seem, at least, to know some substantial part of it, as manifested in the 
capacity to repeat, clarify, or paraphrase what was meant (although I 
will criticize this alleged truism in §4). Still, supposing that competent 
speakers stand in some cognitive relation to mental phrase markers, 
and that the correct theory of this relation either falls into category 
(i) or (ii), sentences will have parts with no corresponding parts in the 
utterance. The most extreme views in category (i) will surely deny the 
very existence of mental phrase markers, but we can set them aside for 
the moment (see Collins (2007) for a moderate (i)-type view).
Assume, then, that speaker/hearers have tacit knowledge, at least, 
of the immediate constituents of a sentence. They automatically pro-
cess sentences in terms of mental phrase markers. So, speakers tacitly 
know about NPs and VPs and constituency-boundaries are even pos-
ited as parts of the abstract syntactic structure of a given sentence. 
But what, if anything, is the part of an utterance of a sentence which 
corresponds to the part of the sentence-cum-phrase-marker that distin-
guishes the VP and the NP? Given that there are verb-subject-object 
languages, such as Irish, where the VP is split by the NP in normal 
word order (Irish is a VSO language), it’s unclear how this question 
could be answered directly. The question falsely presumes that sen-
tence-parts and utterance-parts that go proxy for sentences stand in 
simple, isomorphic mapping relations. Syntactic theory shows that a 
lot of material is properly said to be part of the abstract sentence, while 
having no obvious counterparts in utterances or inscriptions. So, the 
fact that some words have this feature as well should not be objection-
able as such.
3. Two Arguments for Uttering Aphonics 
Neale reports that when he talks of aphonics he is particularly con-
cerned with “… individual expressions that are unpronounced and un-
heard by their nature, expressions that intrinsically lack phonological 
features or instructions for pronunciation” (236, italics in original). The 
idea seems to be that positing aphonics wouldn’t be theoretically excit-
ing unless the lack of phonetic and phonological properties is essential 
to the posited expression. Most theorists allow for aphonics in the less 
substantial sense in which they are actually phonic expressions that 
3 See Devitt (2006) for an example of the fi rst kind of view and Dwyer and 
Pietroski (1996) for an example of the second.
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happen to be omitted on a given occasion. In VP-ellipsis, for example, 
it is important that what is elided be identical to the antecedent verb—
which can either precede or follow the ellipsis—as in ‘Sally drove to 
England and Joe [drove] to Scotland.’ Neale is interested, it seems, in 
expressions partly individuated by their lack of phonology, so that try-
ing to utter them would always result in the production of some distinct 
expression.
This is unfortunate for a number of reasons, the most important 
being the fact that there is no such thing as an intrinsically aphonic ex-
pression. Any expression can be uttered, even if it happens to lack pho-
netic features or instructions for pronunciation. What’s more, Neale 
explicitly recognizes this elsewhere in his paper.
3.1. Uttering
Neale provides a thoroughly intention-based theory of utterance iden-
tity. The question at issue is a metaphysical one: In virtue of what facts 
is a given utterance and acoustic proxy for a given word? Very roughly 
and relative to “a few reasonable assumptions,” Neale writes that “an 
utterance u produced by S on a given occasion is an utterance of expres-
sion e iff S intended u to be an utterance of e” (265). On the face of it, 
this view of utterance identity appears to be incompatible with expres-
sions which are aphonic ‘by their nature.’ We can plug any allegedly 
aphonic expression into Neale’s biconditional and get, as a result, a 
speaker’s utterance of that aphonic expression. So, for example, I can 
intend to utter the aphonic expression ‘PRO’ by articulating the sound 
/pro/ on a given occasion.
What’s more, uttering aphonics is in some sense made easier by 
their lack of phonetic features. There defi nitely is already a standard-
ized way of uttering the aphonic expression ‘PRO,’ at least within lin-
guistics. But, for other less entrenched cases, such as location vari-
ables, it seems like we can choose any phonemic pattern that would 
do the job in the context at hand. Or, in lieu of that, one could utter 
the expression by omission, as discussed above. This fi ts with a theory 
of speech errors I have defended elsewhere, which also incorporates a 
thoroughly intention-based view of utterance identity (Unnsteinsson 
2017). Very roughly, the idea is that when a speaker has expression e1 
as their target but accidentally produces some other expression e2, the 
uttered expression will be a misarticulation of the target expression. It 
was an odd way, and accidentally so at that, of uttering the expression 
which was the speaker’s intended target. Thus, I could intend to utter 
‘Obama’ but accidentally utter ‘Osama.’ On this theory of speech error, 
I will have pronounced ‘Obama’ as ‘Osama’ on that occasion.
So, it seems like we have two options, neither of which allows for the 
possibility of intrinsically aphonic expressions. First, we could say that 
any utterance u where the speaker intends to utter the aphonic e by 
making u is such that e was in fact successfully uttered. Since there are 
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no instructions for pronunciation one really cannot go wrong and any-
thing one does—provided one has e as one’s target in uttering u—will 
count as an acoustic proxy for the aphonic. Secondly, we could say that 
the correct pronunciation of an aphonic expression is in fact silence. 
The instructions for pronunciation indicate that the expression ought 
to be uttered by making no sound at all. In effect, this is taking lack of 
phonetic features to be a kind of phonetic feature. But we don’t need to 
choose between the two options, for both support the same conclusion, 
as noted before. If we take the second option, all utterances of PRO, 
for example, where the speaker intends to utter PRO by making the 
sound PRO (or any other sound) will simply count as a misarticulation 
of the aphonic. Importantly, however, and this is clearly part of the in-
tention-based approach to utterance identity, any such misarticulation 
will still constitute an utterance of the expression. It follows, then, that 
intentionalists must believe that aphonics—though they’re usually not 
heard in utterances—can very well be uttered and heard.4
But what on earth would it be like for an ordinary speaker to have 
an aphonic expression as their target? And how could some sound they 
emit constitute an utterance of that aphonic target? This is part of 
Neale’s aphonic-intention problem, which I will discuss more directly 
below. Let’s consider these questions naively fi rst. It would seem like 
some attempts by ordinary speakers to make themselves absolutely 
clear because of prior misunderstanding might be classifi ed as (tem-
porally extended) utterances of an aphonic like PRO. Say I’m planning 
a road trip with you and Siobhan and we’re deciding who shall drive. 
We’ve been uttering sentences like ‘I want you to drive’ and ‘Siobhan 
wants me to drive,’ so this syntactic structure is primed and we are 
thus a bit more likely to misidentify similar structures. Then I say, 
(5) You or Jane wants to drive,
trying to transfer the responsibility for driving over to you or Jane. 
Primed for misunderstanding, you ask: ‘We want who to drive?’.5 When 
I respond Jane is no longer present. Somewhere along the way, my 
utterance-plan goes badly awry, but what comes out of my mouth is 
something like the following:
(6) *I said you or Jane wants yours-her-self to drive 
Now, of course it is far from obvious what exactly we should say about 
this strange case. Perhaps I had the phonic expression ‘yourself’ fi rst 
as a target and then, thinking I could fi x the error, I had the phonic 
expression ‘herself’ as a target. So, didn’t I just misarticulate those 
expressions? Probably, yes. But let’s assume PRO exists and is really 
an aphonic pronoun controlled, in a case like (5), by the subject of the 
4 For a very different point of view on this, see Hawthorne and Lepore (2011: 
460–465) and Lepore and Stone (2015: 217–220).
5 If the misunderstanding involved here sounds implausible, just imagine this all 
happening over walkie-talkie in a movie from the 80s.
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matrix verb, i.e. ‘You or Jane.’ Add to that the idea that PRO inherits 
the reference from its antecedent. It’s not crazy to suppose, then, that 
when I made the error and uttered /yours-her-self/ my target was an 
expression with exactly those features. I just couldn’t fi nd any phonic 
expression in my mental lexicon which corresponded well to those fea-
tures. The problem is that the subject, ‘You or Jane,’ can easily control 
aphonic PRO, but it can become awkward with an overt refl exive pro-
noun as in (6).
Still, I don’t want the argument to rest entirely on the plausibil-
ity of this kind of case as it may be judged a bit far-fetched. However, 
even if ordinary speakers never have an intention to, as we might say, 
give phonetic realization to an aphonic, it is arguable that experts both 
could and routinely have such intentions. When linguists or philoso-
phers utter or inscribe ‘Wanda wants PRO to win’ or ‘It’s raining in x’ 
one possible description of what they’re doing is that they are uttering 
or inscribing the posited aphonic expression. To support this, I see no 
logical or metaphysical impossibility in the idea that after a few de-
cades the use of PRO would catch on in the general population. This is, 
of course, terribly unlikely, and even more so in the cases which are of 
particular interest to philosophers, like the ideas of aphonic location-
variables or modes of presentation.
There is, however, an obvious objection which is implicit in Neale’s 
own paper. As he notes, when linguists write PRO in a sentence, it’s 
part of their structural description of the sentence (243). So, one could 
say, rather than uttering or inscribing the aphonic expression, what 
linguists are doing is describing, or perhaps simply naming, the expres-
sion. Indeed, since the postulated expression has no phonic properties 
it stands to reason that the expression is either named or described, not 
uttered or inscribed, and that this is what the experts intend. I want 
to fully acknowledge the strength of this point but, it’s equally clear, 
it still doesn’t amount to showing that aphonic expressions like PRO or 
variables for locations are aphonic ‘by their nature.’ If intentionalism 
about utterance identity is assumed, experts can certainly utter these 
expressions if they want to.
In his discussion, Neale introduces PRO as “silent self” which corre-
sponds to what he calls “stilted-‘self’” but he makes clear that he thinks 
they must be different expressions. And it’s clear why he thinks this: 
one is by its nature aphonic and the other is an odd or stilted extension 
of the phonic word ‘self’ into a set of unfamiliar syntactic distributions, 
namely exactly the distribution of PRO or silent self. It follows from 
Neale’s assumptions—although, as already noted, it’s not compatible 
with his notion of utterance identity—that silent self and stilted-‘self’ 
are different. The former is not stilted and the latter is not silent (243). 
But why suppose that this is a robust criterion for individuating words? 
Well, we shouldn’t suppose so. Before arguing for this claim, and re-
sponding properly to the objection from structural descriptions, we 
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need to go through the second argument for the claim that there are no 
intrinsically aphonic expressions.
3.2. Uttering What? 
Let’s agree with Neale that words are abstract artifacts, along with 
things like laws and conventions. Agree also that word-proxies or to-
kenings of words are not words (see his Section 6). But can the nature 
of words as abstract artifacts be described in more detail? It would 
appear so. Wolfram Hinzen and Michelle Sheehan argue, for example, 
that there are four important notions of ‘word’ all of which play signifi -
cant roles in current linguistics.6
First, there is the notion of the word as a prosodic unit (the ‘phonological 
word’); then there is the notion of the semantic word or lexeme, which is the 
word understood as an abstract vocabulary item with a given meaning that 
can take different forms, such as the verb RUN, which can take the forms 
runs, ran, run, etc. Even more abstract is the notion of a lexical root, which 
involves a semantic core possibly shared across lexemes of different catego-
ries, e.g. the root √RUN as involved in the verb run and the homophonous 
noun run, which occurs in the expressions a run, many runs, running, Mary 
runs, etc. Finally, there is the grammatical word: the word as a morphosyn-
tactic unit or as functioning in a sentence context. (38, italics in original)
Neale agrees with Kaplan (1990, 2011) and others that the fi rst unit 
on this list is not what we’re looking for when asking about the meta-
physics of words. Of course, there exists such a prosodic unit, but it’s 
clear that there are psychologically real and important distinctions 
between phonologically and phonetically identical words. More impor-
tantly still, prosodic units can change so dramatically over time that 
their individuation is problematic. Kaplan (2011) and Hawthorne and 
Lepore (2011) argue for something like a lexeme-based theory of word 
identity. On their account, then, words are essentially objects with cer-
tain syntactic markers or properties as well as semantic ones: they are 
verbs or nouns for instance. As Hinzen and Sheehan (ibid.) point out, 
the category of lexeme is almost identical to what many philosophers 
call ‘concepts.’ Then there is also the more abstract notion of lexical 
root, which is shared by different lexemes. Finally, there are morpho-
syntactic units, characterized, for example, by the position the unit oc-
cupies in a phrase-structure tree or the manner in which it interacts 
with various affi xes.
This provides a wealth of possibilities for how philosophers could 
defi ne words. The correct metaphysics of words might incorporate any 
combination of these four properties, and of course, which ones are ap-
propriated may depend on the theoretical purposes at hand. Most theo-
rists seem agreed that, when individuating words for the purposes of 
describing the items stored in the mental lexicon, prosodic units are 
6 Thanks to James Miller for alerting me to this passage (Miller, ‘The Metaphysics 
of Words,’ unpublished).
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not terribly important. There certainly are prosodic units but they are 
non-basic. It’s reasonable to suppose, then, that a metaphysical theory 
of word identity will always incorporate at least one of three proper-
ties: (i) being lexemic, (ii) having a lexical root, and (iii) having a mor-
phosyntactic profi le. Words don’t need phonetic realization—because 
we are assuming that there are aphonics—and whatever phonological 
properties they have can change dramatically, fl uctuate or even disap-
pear. Semantic properties of words allow for similarly dramatic fl uc-
tuations over time.
But here Neale’s point about the difference between silent self and 
stilted-‘self’ may seem relevant: Wouldn’t aphonic and phonic units 
always constitute distinct expressions? No, they would merely be dis-
tinct prosodic units, because all of the other properties could still re-
main intact. Again, as a comparison, does an expression with semantic 
properties become a different expression if it evolves into an expletive, 
‘non-semantic’ unit? For instance, is expletive ‘it’ distinct from ‘it’ occur-
ring as argument? The answer to these two questions would depend on 
whether or not one endorses the lexeme-based view of word identity. 
But the answer to the former, it seems, has to be a direct ‘No.’ Phonetic 
and phonological properties are superfi cial, non-basic features of words. 
Therefore, there is no such thing as an intrinsically aphonic expression.
Now we are also in a position to respond to the objection mentioned 
near the end of Section 3.1 above. According to the objection, when 
experts appear to be uttering aphonic expressions like PRO, silent-self, 
or variables for location, what they are really doing is providing struc-
tural descriptions or merely naming the aphonic item. Well, if both of 
my arguments are sound, this is seen to be unduly ad hoc. If phonologi-
cal properties are superfi cial and utterance identity is determined by 
speakers’ intentions, nothing hinders experts in intending the produc-
tion of a particular sound as the utterance of some postulated aphonic 
expression.7 Before, I gave reasons to think that if such expressions 
exist at all, the omission of any phonic counterpart in an utterance may 
count as an act of uttering an aphonic. I believe it is diffi cult to fi nd 
credible cases of non-expert speakers in fact having intentions to utter 
an aphonic by producing some sound or other. Doing so, however, is 
open to the experts themselves. All I needed to show is that no word—
apart from mere ‘phonological words’ of course—is aphonic by its very 
nature and, so, it is fi ne if it turns out that experts normally consider 
themselves only to be describing or naming aphonics, rather than ac-
tually giving voice to them. But when they in fact intend to utter the 
aphonic by producing some sound or other, the identity of the word in 
question isn’t suddenly altered.
7 There is one other possibility, however. One might simply argue that aphonics 
aren’t expressions at all, that they are much more like phrase structure trees, Case, 
and other parts of the syntactic description of sentences. I fi nd this possibility 
appealing, but won’t address it here, as it would take us too far into different 
territory.
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4. What About the Meaning-Intention Problem?
According to Schiffer and Neale, there is a signifi cant difference be-
tween theories on which speakers have intentions to refer implicitly to 
something like a rain-location and ones on which they have intentions 
to refer implicitly to modes of presentation or epistemic standards. 
When it comes to rain, speakers seem immediately and effortlessly 
aware that they in fact intended to refer to a location even if they omit-
ted any expression whose function is specifi cally to enable such refer-
ence. Ordinarily, when speakers say that it’s raining, they’ll have no 
trouble answering the question ‘Where is it raining?’ if it is somehow 
unclear in the context. So, it may seem, we have good reason to suppose 
that speakers actually have intentions to implicitly refer.
Modes of presentation appear to be different. Many philosophers 
wish to posit modes of presentation to solve puzzles about singular ref-
erence. According to one infl uential theory of this sort, when speakers 
attribute beliefs to others with sentences like (7),
(7) Bianca believes that the hippopotamus is sleeping,
they really express the proposition that Bianca believes, under some 
mode of presentation, that the hippopotamus is sleeping. So, uttering a 
sentence like (7) involves implicit reference to something called a mode 
of presentation (see Neale 2016, §14.4 for details). But, on the face of it, 
speakers are not aware of intending anything of the sort. If the speaker 
were asked to specify which mode of presentation they had in mind 
in uttering (7) the question would usually not be understood. Maybe 
there are more intuitive ways to get at the question, which would bet-
ter track what theorists have in mind by positing these modes, but still, 
the difference between this case and the fi rst one will remain. Normal 
speakers are completely aware that they implicitly refer to locations 
all the time, but, if they do indeed refer to modes of presentation—or 
epistemic standards, according to Schiffer—they haven’t the faintest 
idea that that’s what they’re doing. It follows, then, that only cases of 
the fi rst kind are compatible with the assumption that speakers have 
transparent, privileged access to what they consciously mean, intend, 
and believe in uttering something. And it is reasonable, Schiffer con-
tends, to think that such access is “part of a normal person’s functional 
architecture” (1992: 515; Neale 2016: 320).
Neale argues that aphonic reference presents an even deeper prob-
lem (2016, §14.7). Indeed, if there are theorists who hold that speakers 
refer to modes of presentation with aphonic expressions, it follows that 
they refer to things they don’t know about with things they don’t know 
about. So, Neale asks, is it really plausible to attribute aphonic-involv-
ing referential intentions to speakers at all? Keeping with the example 
from before, it is fairly clear that ordinary speakers don’t appear to 
have conscious beliefs or intentions about things like PRO. Linguists 
didn’t discover PRO until very late in the history of natural languages 
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where PRO is allegedly part of some sentences, so speakers’ access to 
expressions like PRO is very different from their access to expressions 
like ‘eejit.’ The logical conclusion, then, seems to be that positing apho-
nic-involving intentions is also incompatible with Schiffer’s assump-
tion that normal speakers have privileged access to what they mean, 
intend, and believe in uttering something.
Obviously, then, the degree to which these problems are worrying 
should match the degree to which the transparency assumption is in 
fact justifi ed. More precisely, there are at least three hidden assump-
tions at work here:
A1. Speakers have transparent, privileged access to what they con-
sciously intend, mean, and believe in uttering something.
A2. What speakers consciously intend, mean, and believe in utter-
ing something is identical to what they really intend, mean, and 
believe in uttering something.
A3. Interpretation and inference are not necessary in understand-
ing what one oneself intends, means, and believes in uttering some-
thing, but they are necessary in understanding what others intend, 
mean, and believe in uttering something.
Intention-based semantics, as promulgated by Neale and Schiffer, is 
thoroughly wedded to A1–A3. This is unfortunate, not only because it 
will appear to critics that there is no such thing as intentionalism with-
out broadly Cartesian views of the mental, but also because there are 
good reasons to commit transparency to the fl ames. Or so I will argue, 
along lines essentially similar to Neale’s “Tacit States Reply” to the 
meaning-intention problem (2016, §14.12).
4.1. Aphonic-Involving Intentions
Let’s start with the alleged problem with aphonic-involving intentions 
before approaching the broader question of meaning-intentions. As 
stated, the problem is that speakers would be supposed to perform acts 
of meaning, saying, referring, etc., without knowing anything at all 
about the means with which they do so. Clearly, PRO and other apho-
nic expressions will fi t the bill; normal speakers don’t appear to have 
any conscious knowledge that such entities exist. On the other hand, 
speakers appear to know that words exist and they appear to know 
that words and sentences are means by which they express and com-
municate their thoughts and beliefs to others.
That may indeed sound reasonable, but only because it is part of 
folk linguistics and general common sense opinion. If any account of 
the nature of words along the lines of §3.2 above is correct, normal 
speakers have no idea what a word is, because they have no idea what a 
lexeme, root, or morphosyntactic unit is. But this objection is too quick. 
Surely, no one would suggest that naïve speakers know the true meta-
physics of words, what they do know is that there is something in the 
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world, namely utterances of words and sentences, with which people 
communicate. And nothing similar can be said about their knowledge 
of utterances of aphonic expressions.
The deeper problem with this argument is that it draws an illicit 
distinction between words on the one hand and aphonics on the other. 
For if we are to accept aphonics at all, they will belong in the category of 
words; they are merely words without phonetic or phonological proper-
ties. So, if we really want to take folk linguistics seriously, naïve speak-
ers will turn out to know about aphonics in virtue of their admittedly 
superfi cial knowledge of words in general. Neale, it seems, would have 
to draw some principled distinction between phonic expressions and 
aphonic expressions. This would allow him to hold that normal speak-
ers have only encountered utterances of the phonic bit of the lexicon 
and, so, they only have knowledge of words as phonic entities. Aphonics 
are completely beyond their ken.
Apart from the problems already mentioned, especially the point 
that normal speakers may have encountered aphonics in speech by 
witnessing acts of omitting to say something explicitly, drawing this 
distinction is not as easy as it seems. To see this, consider some of 
the most basic theoretical commitments of linguists who pursue an in-
tentionalist theory of phonological competence. Bromberger and Halle 
(2000), for example, argue that phonological descriptions or derivations 
of dated utterances should not be understood merely as phonetic tran-
scriptions of a speech event—i.e. symbols encoding articulatory move-
ments—but as standing for a sequence of intentions which give rise 
to those movements. Simplifying dramatically, the IPA transcription 
[ɹ̠ʷɛd], occurring in a phonological derivation of an utterance, doesn’t 
merely record the phonetic segmentation of an event of uttering ‘red’ 
into the three stages of (i) labialized postalveolar approximant, (ii) 
open-mid front unrounded vowel and, fi nally, (iii) voiced alveolar stop. 
It represents the phonetic intention that called for this complex se-
quence of articulatory movements and positionings. This kind of inten-
tion is grounded in linguistic competence, since speakers can very well 
make the requisite sounds and movements encoded by [ɹ̠ʷɛd] without 
having the intention to utter a word of English, for example if they 
don’t know the language but just happened to produce the sound in the 
manner required. Phonetic intentions are intentions, then, to produce 
speech sounds of specifi c languages. 
But what, more specifi cally, are the objects of phonetic intentions? 
According to Bromberger and Halle (2000: 26–27), speakers must, at 
least, have intentions to produce morphemes. A morpheme is either a 
stem or an affi x of a word; ‘an-arch-ic’, for example, has two affi xes, ‘an’ 
(prefi x), and ‘ic’ (suffi x), and one stem, ‘arch’. A single stem, on this kind 
of theory, can be pronounced differently in different linguistic environ-
ments. The stem ‘sell’ is sometimes pronounced /sold/ and sometimes 
/sells/, depending on tense and Case agreement. So, whenever I intend 
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to produce a phonic word I retrieve information about each morpheme 
from memory, and utter the resulting combination or transformation. 
Now, we have already attributed intentions to speakers which will be 
completely unrecognizable to them. Normal speakers usually do not, 
and need not, know anything at all about the morphemic structure of 
the words they use. Neither do they need to know that morphemes 
exist; and they normally don’t know. Nevertheless, very basic commit-
ments in (some of) phonological theory involve the attribution of inten-
tions to pronounce morphemes to ordinary speakers. It seems, then, 
that the assumption of transparency would require a wholesale rejec-
tion of these ideas, or very radical revision of foundational assump-
tions. Neither option is appealing, since dropping transparency seems 
the easier thing to do (see next section).
Before moving on, it should be noted that adding just one layer 
of complexity into this analysis will make phonetic intentions to ut-
ter phonics appear just as problematic as phonetic intentions to utter 
aphonics. Plural and past-tense affi xes in English have radically dif-
ferent phonological features in different environments. Consider the 
examples from Bromberger and Halle (2000: 27):
Plural morpheme: cat/s, child/ren, kibbutz/im, alumn/i, stigma/ta, 
geese, moose
Past-tense morpheme: bake/d, playe/d, dream/t, sol/d, sang, hit
To explain these irregular affi xes, they propose a category of abstract 
morphemes symbolized with the letter Q. Q has no direct phonetic in-
terpretation but, as I understand the idea, it encodes information about 
how the morpheme is pronounced (it is an ‘identifying index’). Brom-
berger and Halle take care to note that ‘Q’ is part of the notation of the 
theory, and not a symbol that really occurs ‘in the mind’ of the speaker. 
But this is at best an admission that we simply lack knowledge in this 
area, since they expect more work in linguistics will eventually reveal 
mental structures corresponding to representations in the notation of 
the theory (2000: 26n10). The bottom line, however, is that speakers 
of English do utter plural and past-tense morphemes, and they must 
then, in some sense to be explained, intend to utter Q. But it appears 
that Q either doesn’t encode any phonological information, because the 
phonetics of Q are so radically dissimilar on different occasions of ut-
terance, or the information is almost impossible to specify, even theo-
retically. Further, it is part of one fairly infl uential theory of phonologi-
cal competence that when speakers intend to utter some phonics, they 
must intend to utter abstract morphemes like Q. Thus, I conclude, it 
has not been shown that intentions to utter aphonics have to be more 
problematic than intentions to utter phonics.
4.2. Access to Propositional Attitudes
The argument, so far, may seem to amount to no more than simple 
buck-passing. Surely, one would like to say, there is a world of differ-
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ence between conscious, personal-level intentions like the intention to 
mean that p by uttering X and any subpersonal intention or other men-
tal state involved in knowing the grammar of a language. And so, the 
thought continues, we haven’t solved any problem by attributing, say, 
phonetic intentions to speakers and hearers. Indeed, there is much rea-
son to think that this is merely a façon de parler awaiting elimination 
when science progresses (Collins 2007, 2008). True, this is a popular 
and plausible way of thinking about these issues but, I want to argue, 
the problems involved in personal-level intention attribution are much 
more pressing and consequential than many philosophers of language 
have hitherto allowed for. Possibly, speakers are built to consciously 
represent themselves, to themselves, as having certain intentions and 
beliefs, without this being a good indicator that those are the intentions 
or beliefs that they actually have. If so, talking in terms of ‘conscious 
intentions’ is also just a manner of speaking awaiting elimination.
Start with the nutshell description of Gricean intention-based se-
mantics, or intentionalism for short, coming from Neale, Schiffer and 
others. According to intentionalism, what the speaker says and means 
by making an utterance on an occasion is metaphysically determined 
by certain specifi c audience-directed intentions. What is strictly said 
by the speaker may need to conform, in some sense, to the linguis-
tic meaning of the sentence uttered, but what is otherwise meant—
e.g. conversational implicatures—can roam freely from any such con-
straint. So, for instance, if I utter,
(8) Meet me at the bank,
the only facts that can determine whether I meant a river bank or a 
fi nancial institution are facts about my communicative intention at the 
time of utterance. The context could be such as to make it appear to my 
audience that I meant the river bank—if I’m holding a fi shing rod, for 
example— even if I really intend to refer to a fi nancial institution, and 
so they might very well misunderstand me. And in many such cases the 
responsibility for the misunderstanding falls squarely on the speaker’s 
shoulders; they failed to take the full context into consideration before 
speaking. But it is still the intention that determines which interpreta-
tion is the correct one. Neale (2005: 179–180) describes this in terms 
of an epistemic asymmetry between the speaker and hearer. Speakers 
know what they mean and the hearer’s job is to work it out. The speak-
er normally doesn’t need to work this out, they simply know what they 
mean without interpretation or inference.
Already, I believe, it is important to pry this apart. Even if it is con-
ceded that speakers normally know what they mean, or some part of it, 
this must be fl agged as a thesis in the epistemology of interpretation. 
According to intentionalism, what I said in uttering (8) on an occasion 
is determined by my communicative intention, it is not determined—
except in the epistemological sense of that word—by what I believe I in-
tended to say. Neither is it determined by what I believe my intention 
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is while uttering (8). Sure, I could fi nd out what my intention was in 
uttering (8) by forming a belief about the intention. The difference be-
tween the hearer and myself here is, at least, that I often have access to 
more data—my own mental imagery at the time for example—and may 
often form my belief without waiting to hear the words I utter. Perhaps 
this higher-order belief is formed automatically and unconsciously, but 
it can surely be mistaken like any other belief. Note, however, that 
more data does not necessarily result in more reliable judgment, as it 
might just overwhelm one’s cognitive system and lead to an increased 
number of errors. Sometimes, cognitive processes are more reliable if 
they use only a limited collection of evidence (Gigerenzer et al. 1999; 
Carruthers 2011: 24). Further, as Peter Carruthers (2011, Ch. 2.5; also 
pp. 12, 22, 70) has argued, Cartesian transparency derives no support 
from phenomenological observation, contrary to widespread opinion. 
Beliefs about what others mean in uttering something are formed just 
as automatically and sub-consciously as beliefs about what we our-
selves mean, intend, or believe. And we have often formed those beliefs 
as hearers, automatically and predictively, before the speaker puts a 
stop to the sentence or even before they say anything. And this is pre-
dicted by so-called ‘forward models’ of human cognition (e.g., Pickering 
and Clark 2014). Normally, people simply fi nd themselves with beliefs 
about what speakers meant, with no insight into how exactly the belief 
was formed. We seem also simply to fi nd ourselves with such beliefs 
about our own propositional attitudes.
4.2.1. Arguments from Modularity
As Carruthers (2011) argues at length, there are good empirical and 
theoretical reasons to think that the human mind—or a specifi c mind-
reading module in the mind—automatically adheres to cognitive proce-
dures which assume the mind is transparent to itself. If so, it is just a 
near-universal assumption of humans that if one thinks one is in men-
tal state M then one must actually be in mental state M and, also, that 
if one thinks one is not in mental state M then one must really not be 
in that mental state (ibid., p. 12). This cognitive procedure is compat-
ible with the suggestion that, in fact, people routinely confabulate and 
misinterpret their own mental states. And experimental fi ndings indi-
cate that when such confabulation occurs, people don’t have subjective 
access to the information that their self-attribution of a mental state 
was a complete fabrication. Carruthers takes, as an example, research 
on commissurotomy patients, where different stimuli are presented to 
the two hemispheres at the same time.
The patient fi xated his eyes on a point straight ahead, while two cards were 
fl ashed up, one positioned to the left of fi xation (which would be available 
only to the right hemisphere) and on to the right of fi xation (which would be 
available only to the left hemisphere). When the instruction, “Walk!” was 
fl ashed to the right brain, the subject got up and began to walk out of the 
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testing van. (The right hemisphere of this subject was capable of some lim-
ited understanding of words, but, had no production abilities.) When asked 
where he was going, he (the left brain, which controlled speech-production 
as well as housing a mindreading system) replied, “I’m going to get a Coke 
from the house.” This attribution of a current intention to himself was 
plainly confabulated, since the actual reason for initiating the action was 
accessible only to the right hemisphere. Yet it was delivered with all of the 
confi dence and seeming introspective obviousness as normal. (2011: 39–40)
Even if patients are reminded, and made fully aware, that the sur-
gery can have effects on their access to their own mental states, they 
still insist that they know for sure what they really intend to do. As 
Carruthers emphasizes, this does not support total skepticism about 
self-knowledge, but it does show that confabulated mental states will 
appear just as transparently accessible to us as their authentic coun-
terparts.
Now, let’s look again at the transparency assumptions A1–A3, 
starting with the fi nal one.
A3. Interpretation and inference are not necessary in understand-
ing what one oneself intends, means, and believes in uttering some-
thing, but they are necessary in understanding what others intend, 
mean, and believe in uttering something.
As already noted, this assumption gets no support from intuition or 
fi rst-person phenomenology, since the cognitive process by which we 
form beliefs about the intentions of others is just as immediate and 
automatic as that by which we form such beliefs about ourselves. But 
more substantively, as Carruthers (2011) argues, if one likes the idea 
that the mind houses a mindreading module specifi cally geared to-
wards the task of attributing mental states to intentional agents, some 
very serious empirical arguments can be mustered against A3. I will 
only give the fl avor of these arguments here, and go on to focus more 
directly on assumptions A1 and A2.
First, assume that there is a mental module for mindreading. Sec-
ondly, we can then ask: What is our best theory of the nature and evo-
lution of this module? This is where Carruthers would introduce his 
interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of mindreading, according to 
which the module only has sensory access to its domain, and this ac-
cess is always—with two notable exceptions, namely aspects of percep-
tual and emotion-like states (2011, Ch. 4, 5)—interpretive rather than 
transparent. And so, the ISA theory predicts that when one attributes 
propositional attitudes traditionally so-called—intention, belief, judg-
ment, desire, etc.—one must engage in interpretation in both self-at-
tributions and other-attributions. This prediction derives some support 
from the observation that a mindreading module is most likely to have 
evolved in response to strong social pressures on individuals to acquire 
capacities to predict and explain the complex and varied behavior of 
other individuals. If this is in fact the most plausible evolutionary story 
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we can tell, the simplest hypothesis, according to Carruthers, “…is that 
self-knowledge is achieved by turning one’s mindreading capacities on 
oneself” (2011: 65). And this, in turn, would suggest that our access 
to our own mental states is, in essence, the same as our access to the 
mental states of others, namely by means of inferences based on vari-
ous sensory cues. In our own case, the data pool will usually be very 
different, however, involving many private mental episodes and access 
to personal memory.8
4.2.2. Arguments from Dual System Psychology
Whatever one thinks about modules for mindreading, there is a strong 
case to be made against Cartesian transparency on the basis of dual 
system theories in psychology, or ‘fragmentational’ theories of mind 
more generally. By now it is a fairly standard view, but certainly not 
universal, in the cognitive sciences that the human mind has a fast, 
intuitive, automatic, and nonconscious processing component and a 
more effortful, refl ective, and conscious component which is subject to 
voluntary control (cf. Evans and Frankish 2009).9 Call the fi rst ‘System 
1’ and the second ‘System 2’. There is much controversy about how ex-
actly the two Systems relate to one another and how they ought to be 
defi ned. System 1, or parts of it, is evolutionarily ancient and is shared 
with some non-human animals. System 2 is thought to be more distinc-
tively human or, at least, more developed in humans than in other ani-
mals. Either the Systems are distinct capacities with different evolu-
tionary histories and physical realizations or they are different ways of 
utilizing the same cognitive resources, with System 2 operations partly 
realized in System 1 processes (Carruthers 2009; 2011: 98–101).
Either way, however, if mental partition of this sort is granted, we 
can inquire into the characteristics of content-bearing mental states as 
they occur in System 1 or System 2 processing respectively. Philoso-
phers have recently, for example, been very interested in cases where 
people sincerely profess to deeply held attitudes—e.g. egalitarianism, 
anti-racism—while unrefl ective, ‘System 1-based’ behavior and cogni-
tion seems to manifest diametrically opposed attitudes (Gendler 2008; 
Schwitzgebel 2010). The possibility of such cases should not be taken 
as proof that there are two mental Systems or two fundamentally dif-
ferent species of propositional attitude (Gigerenzer and Regier 1996; 
8 Of course it should be noted that this story is contested, most obviously by 
simulation theorists like Goldman (2006) who argue that self-directed metacognitive 
abilities are evolutionarily prior to other-directed mindreading abilities.
9 If such a heavy-duty psychological theory, much of which is hotly contested, is 
not allowed as an assumption, we could make do with a fragmentational or partitive 
theory of the mind (as in Lewis 1982; Davidson 1982; Egan 2008; Mandelbaum 2015). 
All we really need is the idea that propositional attitudes can be causally isolated 
from one another within a single mind, making it possible for a single mind to harbor 
inconsistent beliefs or intentions at any given point in time. Many theorists fi nd the 
System 1/System 2 distinction relatively intuitive, so I use it here.
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Mandelbaum 2015), but they are helpful in understanding the status 
and interaction of different kinds of content-bearing states of mind. To 
fi x ideas, call contentful mental states occurring in System 1 processes 
‘A-attitudes’ or ‘A-states’ and those occurring in System 2 processes ‘B-
attitudes’ or ‘B-states’. A-states are ancient, automatic, and (perhaps) 
associative while B-states are bookkeepers who, normally lagging be-
hind, strive to be boss over A-states. Tamar Gendler (2008) calls A-
state beliefs ‘aliefs’ and B-state beliefs ‘beliefs’ but I prefer my own ter-
minology for sake of generality; now we get to talk about A-intentions 
vs B-intentions, and so on.
Start with beliefs. Suppose an individual S has the B-belief that not 
p and seems also to know full well that S has that very belief. Of course, 
S need not realize that the belief is a B-belief since S may not make the 
A/B-distinction. It’s possible, then, that S also has the A-belief that p, 
directly contradicting the content of S’s B-belief. For example, S could 
be an implicit or unconscious racist, A-believing that other races are 
inferior, while B-believing that they are not. S’s B-belief will consist 
in things like S consciously and intentionally professing to egalitarian 
and anti-racist attitudes. S may even rehearse, in inner speech, the 
conscious B-belief that other races are not inferior. But, surely, this is 
compatible with the opposing A-belief being manifested in reasoning, 
action, and automatic reactions to relevant situations. Finally, there is 
no longer a clear sense in which S knows that S believes that other rac-
es are not inferior. For, one might think, genuine belief should require 
at least the presence of A-belief. We might say instead, in this kind of 
case, that S merely knows that S professes to believe that not p while 
really believing that p. Often, the real belief will turn out to be ‘noncon-
scious,’ but this doesn’t seem necessary (Frankish 2016; Hunter 2011).
As Keith Frankish (2004) and Carruthers (2011) have argued, us-
ing different terminology, B-beliefs are much more like commitments 
than truthful reports of contentful mental states. When I say to myself, 
or to others, that I believe p, I commit myself to this belief. More spe-
cifi cally, if I happen to take such commitments seriously, I measure 
myself according to the standard of believing that p: I aim to make my 
behavior expressive of the belief, experience disappointment when this 
fails, and exhort myself to stand by my word. Importantly, however, 
even if my commitment results in everything appearing as if I really 
believe p, commitment is not identical to belief. Unless, perhaps, one 
is a full-blown instrumentalist or anti-realist about content-bearing 
mental states. Let’s commit to ignoring such views for the time being. 
To see the point, one just needs to note the relativity and variability of 
commitment-attitudes across different individuals and across different 
times for the same individual. Many people routinely commit to things 
without having any apparent control over relevant behavior or reason-
ing. So, it seems, the causal profi le of commitment-attitudes depends 
entirely on which other higher-order attitudes are held by the person 
in question; in the case of belief it may depend on whether they believe 
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they actually have made the commitment, whether they want, gener-
ally, to make good on their commitments, and so on.
This immediately contrasts with the causal profi le of belief, where 
the question of whether one really has a belief does not depend on at-
titudes of this kind. And, Carruthers (2011: 102–107) argues, the same 
thought applies to decisions, judgments, wonderings, and supposings. 
An actual decision to do something should “settle the matter” by itself, 
while saying to oneself that one will do it—committing to it—only does 
so in concert with the right beliefs and desires. Surely, committing to 
the truth of p may result, in due course, in the A-belief that p. And, 
generally, self-attribution of the belief that p may be self-fulfi lling in 
that it gives rise to various pressures on one to behave as if the at-
tribution is true. But committing and believing are still importantly 
different. Further, one’s commitment-attitudes are seriously vulner-
able to systematic and immediate confabulation as well as self-directed 
propaganda and deception, for example in the service of perpetuating 
a certain self-image (Wilson 2002).10 I may commit to p being true be-
cause of wishful thinking, B-believing sincerely that I A-believe that p 
(assuming I have the concept of A-belief), while not really A-believing 
anything of the sort.
Now, how could this apply to cases like appearing to know what 
one means in saying something on a particular occasion? Surely this is 
different from having automatic or non-introspectible attitudes; when 
one means that p by uttering X one consciously intends to mean that 
p and has fairly reliable knowledge that this is so, right? Remember, 
however, that the point is not to show that speakers never know what 
they mean, only that their access to what they mean is interpretive, in-
ferential and prone to error, just like their access to what others mean. 
And what I have tried to show is that even if speakers know what they 
B-intend, it doesn’t follow that they know what they A-intend. Further, 
it is quite likely that the contents of A-intentions differ radically and 
systematically from the contents of B-intentions, even when both are 
occurrent attitudes a speaker has in making an utterance. So, the idea 
goes, speakers may A-intend the proposition that p while actually B-
intending the proposition that q. What counts as successful interpreta-
tion, on this kind of view, is not completely obvious. But one possibility 
is that recognizing the A-intention is suffi cient by itself, while recogniz-
ing the B-intention is not, because it only gives the hearer knowledge 
of what the speaker consciously believes about the content of the inten-
tion. But surely, this is often a good indicator of belief-contents, or some 
10 In Kent Bach’s (1981) terminology, believing that p is different from thinking 
that p. So, if I believe that p but want to deceive myself into not believing that p I 
can fi ll my mind with thoughts to the effect that p is false, whenever I have occasion 
to consider my belief. This does not necessarily change my belief, but it may result in 
self-deception, that is, my conscious thoughts and imaginings will only ever suggest 
that I believe that p is false, when I really believe it is true. Commitment is more like 
merely thinking to oneself than really believing.
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parts of such contents, and will normally be good enough for purposes 
of everyday communication. But this is all very abstract. Let’s consider 
two kinds of cases where there is, arguably, an actual mismatch be-
tween communicative A-intentions and communicative B-intentions. 
Hypnosis. As Carruthers (2011: 342–343; citing Wegner 2002) re-
ports, subjects who are given instructions while hypnotized will invent 
new intentions when asked to explain why the do what they do after 
waking from the hypnotic trance. It is likely, then, that subjects form 
intentions and make decisions to act while under hypnosis, and those 
intentions remain active when they regain consciousness. The inten-
tion, say, to open the book on the table when you see it, may have 
been implanted while hypnotized but, when asked why you opened the 
book, you will automatically form some confabulated belief; that you’ve 
always wanted to read Anthony Huxley’s Illustrated History of Garden-
ing, for instance.
To control for merely pragmatic reasons for subjects to report some 
reason or other—when they don’t really know why they are perform-
ing the post-hypnotic action—Carruthers suggests that even ambig-
uous actions would lead to error prone self-interpretation. So, out of 
two possible interpretations, the subject would self-ascribe the action 
which is more plausible in the context, without detecting any mismatch 
between A/B-intentions. He proposes an experiment where the bodily 
movements of the subject will be ambiguous between waving goodbye 
to someone and waving away a bug. But we can also go back to our 
‘bank’-example above. Suppose we have a hypnotized subject, Beatrix, 
who is already fairly likely to take money to the bank, and likely to go 
fi shing on the river bank. Suppose, then, that the hypnotist instructs 
her as follows: “You’re holding your daughter’s money box to make a 
deposit into her savings account. When you meet Abigail tell her you’re 
going to the bank, so she can join you there.” Let’s also assume that 
this is suffi cient to implant, in Beatrix, the A-intention to tell Abigail to 
come along to the fi nancial bank and that this very intention remains 
active after she emerges from hypnosis. When she is then placed in 
a situation where the other sense of ‘bank’ is much likelier to be at 
play, the current prediction is that she would form a B-intention to tell 
Abigail that she’s going to the river bank. Assume, for example, that 
Abigail and Beatrix are much more likely to go fi shing than to go to a 
fi nancial institution and that, when they meet, they’re close to the river 
bank and Beatrix is holding her fi shing rod (as well as her daughter’s 
money box).
A competing description of this case is, surely, that the conscious 
A-intention to refer to a river bank always supplants the alleged B-
intention. But I see this as no more than banging one’s Cartesian head 
against the wall. That is to say, if intuitions of fi rst-person transpar-
ency are not allowed to carry weight, both descriptions are at least 
prima facie plausible, and the issue should be decided by more general 
theoretical considerations. So, it seems possible that both Beatrix and 
376 E. Unnsteinsson, Saying without Knowing What or How
Abigail misrepresented and misunderstood the former’s (A-)intention 
when she uttered ‘bank’.
Implicature and illocution. According to intentionalism, conversa-
tional implicature is determined by the speaker’s communicative in-
tention on the occasion of utterance. The question of whether or not I 
conversationally implicate the proposition in (10) by uttering (9) in a 
particular context is, thus, answered by fi nding out whether I actually 
intended to be understood as talking about an open gas station or a 
closed one (see Grice 1989: 32).
  (9) There is a gas station around the corner
(10) that the gas station is open
Implicature breeds plausible deniability. If it turns out that the gas 
station is closed and, having been reprimanded for misleadingly imply-
ing that it was open, I am free to insist that no such thing as (10) was 
intended. Importantly, however, I am either telling the truth or not. I 
may have actually intended to implicate (10), succeeded, and then lied 
about my intention when I realized (10) wasn’t true. Alternatively, I 
may not have intended to implicate that (10) by uttering (9); that’s 
why my later denial can be plausible, for it could, as far as the hearer 
knows, be true.
But plausible deniability, in turn, breeds credulous self-deception, 
or so I argue. If it is easy to deny, when challenged, that something was 
part of one’s intention, it is also easy to believe that it actually wasn’t, 
even when this is a form of self-deception. A single propositional at-
titude only relates to behavior in concert with other attitudes. So, I 
will only take the umbrella when I believe it’s raining if, among other 
things, I also don’t want to get wet. But suppose I don’t really believe 
it’s raining and I erroneously self-ascribe the belief that it’s raining. As 
Carruthers (2011: 94) points out, I can still explain why I didn’t take 
my umbrella, while preserving the basic belief—consisting in a near-
universally shared cognitive procedure—that my mind is introspective-
ly transparent to itself. I can simply say, to myself, that I really wanted 
to get wet or that I briefl y forgot about the rain while leaving the house. 
Similarly, if people are put in a situation where it is better—for their 
self-image or because of social pressure, say—to form the false belief 
that they didn’t intend to imply something or other, they will probably 
tend to form exactly that belief, immediately and unconsciously. 
Consider, by way of example, an argument between a conservative 
and a liberal about immigration policy. In conversation, Conn has been 
advocating tight restrictions on the free movement of labor, while Lib-
by wants to abolish national borders. Without articulating explicitly 
how the statement relates to the more general issue, Conn says,
(11) But the Polish are hard-working.
In this context, Libby may think that Conn is, by uttering (11), imply-
ing or presupposing something like: (i) other groups of immigrants are 
not hard-working, or: (ii) groups of immigrants should only be allowed 
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to enter the country if they have certain character traits, hard-work-
ing being one of them, or even: (iii) non-whites are not hard-working 
(this would require the conversational salience of non-white immigrant 
groups). And it is not hard to conceive that Conn really did intend to 
imply one of (i)–(iii) but, equally, in order to preserve an anti-racist 
self-image, he could deceive himself into consciously thinking that no 
such thing as (iii) was really intended. Conn could think to himself be-
fore uttering (11): I won’t be implying anything like (iii) because I don’t 
believe (iii). But he might still A-believe something like (iii). So, in such 
a case, plausible deniability becomes a tool for easy self-deception. Un-
conscious A-intentions and conscious B-intentions come apart.
Consider also the illocutionary force of an utterance. Rae Langton 
(2009: 33–34) argues that speakers sometimes perform illocutionary 
acts they don’t actually intend to perform. Taking an example from J.L. 
Austin (1962), she imagines one man saying to another,
(12) Shoot her,
referring to a woman nearby. According to Langton, the speaker (S) 
may have intended the utterance merely as advice while the hearer (H) 
actually takes it as an order. She argues, further, that since illocution-
ary force ought to be partly defi ned in terms of conversational uptake, 
the act of uttering (12) in this context may objectively have the illocu-
tionary force of ordering, rather than advising, regardless of S’s inten-
tion. This goes against the basic premise of intentionalism, according 
to which H would simply have misunderstood S’s actual intention in 
taking the utterance as an order, if it was really (intended as) mere 
advice. And so, on this view, the speech act had the illocutionary force 
of giving advice.
The point here is not to argue against Langton’s description but, 
rather, to show how the distinction between A-attitudes and B-attitudes 
affords us with a different perspective on a case like this one. Suppose, 
for instance, that in some sense S is aware or ought to be aware that 
the utterance might be understood as an order in the context. S knows, 
say, that H is somewhat deferential and complaisant to others. Still, 
S could convince themself, even just momentarily, that uttering (12) 
in this context is merely giving advice, not issuing a command. So, it 
seems, S B-intends the utterance of (12) as advice but A-intends it as 
an order. If this is possible, Langton’s description is partly vindicated, 
even on minimally intentionalist grounds. That is to say, the speech act 
was really an act of ordering, even if the speaker consciously thought 
what they were doing was giving a piece of advice. But, on these as-
sumptions, S couldn’t have A-intended (12) as mere advice because S 
A-believes that (12) is more likely to be taken as an order.
Developing this point in the detail it deserves will have to wait for a 
different occasion. We have, however, established so far that assump-
tions A1 and A2 of so-called Cartesian transparency are not nearly as 
safe as intentionalists tend to believe.
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A1. Speakers have transparent, privileged access to what they con-
sciously intend, mean, and believe in uttering something.
A2. What speakers consciously intend, mean, and believe in utter-
ing something is identical to what they really intend, mean, and 
believe in uttering something.
First, it is doubtful that speakers have transparent access to conscious 
intentions (A1) but, even if this is conceded, it is considerably more 
doubtful that speakers’ conscious intentions are constitutive of their 
actual intentions. We tell ourselves all sorts of things, and appear to 
act for all sorts of fabricated reasons, without thereby having transpar-
ent knowledge of the contents of our actual propositional attitudes.
Where does this leave us? Well, intention-based semantics, as far 
as I can see, still stands as a metaphysical theory of what grounds or 
determines the proposition(s) expressed by a speaker in making an ut-
terance on a given occasion. This will be the speaker’s communicative 
intentions, however exactly those are spelled out in the fi nal theory. 
Still, since transparency is a doubtful epistemological thesis, the mean-
ing-intention problem becomes less of a sweeping tool for eliminating 
implicit reference than it appeared to be. Surely, the fact that speak-
ers believe that they implicitly refer to locations in saying things like 
‘It’s raining’, still constitutes some evidence that this is indeed part of 
their communicative intention. And, conversely, their apparent lack 
of awareness of intending to refer implicitly to epistemic standards or 
modes of presentation gives some reason to think that they don’t. This 
is simply because people do know something about what they mean, 
intend, and believe. But they also know something, and in a similar 
way, about what others mean, intend, and believe. And it is quite pos-
sible that some parts of speakers’ intended meaning are less noticeable 
from a fi rst-person perspective, while being more so from a third-per-
son point of view.
Stephen Schiffer (1992) is clearly concerned with arguing against 
philosophers’ over-intellectualization of normal speakers of natural 
language. He argues that since the nonphilosopher would not even 
have access to the form of a specifi cation of the property of modes of 
presentation postulated by a given theory of belief ascription, it beg-
gars belief to suppose that such a person could intend to refer to the 
property (1992: 513). On this view, we are barred from positing parts 
into conscious propositional attitudes of which the subject cannot pos-
sibly conceive. I rehearse this here to make three related points. First, 
this is only credible as an account of our access to conscious attitudes. 
As we have seen, these may only be tenuously related to other men-
tal attitudes. Secondly, intentionalism is in danger of succumbing to 
another kind of intellectualism, namely, the intellectualism inherent 
in assumptions of transparency. The apparent fact that people have 
fairly reliable knowledge of the contents of their mental states is not 
suffi cient to show that there is no gap between the content and the 
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knowledge of that content. Otherwise, our similarly reliable perceptual 
capacities should point in the same direction, but everyone allows that 
there is illusion and hallucination in that case (Carruthers 2011: 34). 
Thirdly, intentionlists who accept mental transparency run the risk of 
trivializing propositional attitude ascription generally. That is to say, 
if a propositional attitude is composed of two items p and q—one being, 
e.g., what is said and the other what is implicated—and subjects are 
generally worse at consciously detecting q-type contents than p-type 
contents, attitude attributions by theorists will be systematically im-
poverished. Arguably, some people are worse than others in conscious-
ly detecting some types of propositional attitudes; especially fi gurative 
meanings, emotional attitudes, and conversational implicatures. Take 
fi gurative meaning interpretation, for example. The ability to interpret 
and understand metaphorical and ironical utterances can be severely 
restricted by low IQ, various brain damages and disorders, schizophre-
nia, and autistic spectrum disorder (Gibbs and Colston 2012: 286–296).
Further, at least if Carruthers (2011, Ch. 10) is right, the empirical 
evidence suggests that there is no dissociation between other-direct-
ed and self-directed mindreading abilities; that is, whenever subjects 
are cognitively restricted in their capacity to recognize mental states 
in others they are also restricted in their capacity to recognize those 
mental states in themselves. Supposing, then, that there is some prop-
erty F of propositional attitudes such that normal subjects are not very 
good at fi nding out about F, transparency-theorists will tend to believe 
that F is never really a property of propositional attitudes. But there is 
good reason, especially given the distinction between A-attitudes and 
B-attitudes, to think there might very well be F-properties. So, trans-
parency amounts to trivializing the contents of mental states by sys-
tematically disallowing any F-type property. Now, I have by no means 
shown that implicit reference to epistemic standards or to modes of 
presentation must be F-properties of propositional attitudes. But the 
argument against that possibility was only, as I understood it, that 
there couldn’t be F-properties or, at least, there couldn’t be very com-
plicated and unintuitive F-properties which ordinary speakers couldn’t 
possibly conceive of. It follows from the above, however, that epistemic 
standards and modes of presentation might very well be implicit parts 
of propositional attitudes, however complex. So, in that respect, they 
are in the same boat as PRO, location-variables, and the like.
5. Conclusion
I conclude that being a Mad Catter isn’t all that bad. Mad Catters 
believe that it is possible to utter an expression with no phonological 
properties. They may also believe that only utterances of words—not 
the word-types—have meanings that compose into utterance meanings 
for the wholes of which they are proper parts. I have argued elsewhere 
that this is very doubtful (Unnsteinsson 2014), but it is not doubtful be-
380 E. Unnsteinsson, Saying without Knowing What or How
cause, as Neale claims, there couldn’t be such a thing as an utterance of 
an aphonic. I also conclude that speakers’ lack of conscious awareness 
that they are using aphonics, and their lack of conscious awareness 
that they intend to say and/or mean that p by uttering something on a 
given occasion, does not imply that they don’t use aphonics or that they 
don’t, on that occasion, say and/or mean that p.
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